All posts by Alice Hutchings

Join Our 3-Course Series on Cybersecurity Economics

On 2 October, TU Delft are starting a new online three course series on cybersecurity economics. I am co-teaching this course with Michel van Eeten (TU Delft), Daniel Woods (University of Edinburgh), Simon Parkin (TU Delft), Rolf van Wegberg (TU Delft), Tyler Moore (Tulsa Uni) and Rainer Böhme (Innsbruck Uni). The course also features content from Ross Anderson (University of Cambridge), recorded before his passing. Ross was passionate about teaching, and was deeply involved in the design of this MOOC.

The first course on Foundation and Measurement provides you with foundational micro-economic concepts to explain security behavior of various actors involved securing the organization – internally, like IT and business units, and externally, like suppliers, customers and regulators. Next, it equips you with a causal framework to understand how to measure the effectiveness of security controls, as well as what measurements are currently available.

The second course on Users and Attackers presents a wealth of insights on the individuals involved in security: from user behavior to the strategies of attackers. Contrary to popular opinion, users are not the weakest link. If you want to know why do users not follow company security policies, you need to look at the costs imposed on them. On the side of the attackers, there are also clear incentives at work. The course covers the latest insights on attacker behavior.

The third course on Solutions covers answers to overcome the incentive misalignment and information problems at the level of organizations and at the level of markets. Starting with the standard framework of risk management, the course unpacks how to identify solutions in risk mitigation and risk transfer and where risk acceptance might be more rational. Finally, we need to address market failures, since they end up undermining the security of firms and society at large.

Hiring for AP4L

I’m hiring a Research Assistant/Associate to work on the EPSRC-funded Adaptive PETs to Protect & emPower People during Life Transitions (AP4L) project. The project is being undertaken with the Universities of Surrey, Queen Mary, Strathclyde, Edge Hill, and Edinburgh.

AP4L is a program of interdisciplinary research, centring on the online privacy & vulnerability challenges that people face when going through major life transitions. The four transitions we are considering in the scope of this project are relationship breakdowns; LBGT+ transitions or transitioning gender; entering/ leaving employment in the Armed Forces; and developing a serious illness or becoming terminally ill. Our central goal is to develop privacy-by-design technologies to protect & empower people during these transitions.

We are looking for a researcher with experience in quantitative data analysis, threat assessment, data science, machine learning and/or natural language processing, as well as excellent programming and technical writing skills. Expertise in cybercrime or privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) research is desirable, but not essential. Successful applicants will review the relevant literature, design research projects, develop tools, collect and analyse data, and write research outputs.

The role will analyse life transitions from the attacker’s perspective, such as how and where they gather information about their victims. This will require the analysis of cybercrime forums and similar data at scale. Furthermore, the tools we develop are designed for an adversarial context. Adversaries include those known to individuals, such as interfamilial abuse, as well as targeted and indiscriminate attacks. The researcher will also undertake a rigorous threat analysis for each of the tools developed within the overall project.

The full details are available here.

Assistant/Associate Professor in Security and Privacy

The Department of Computer Science and Technology is hiring six new faculty members, including an Assistant or Associate Professor in the area of Privacy and/or Security.


The Department is one of the world leaders in computer security, with outstanding historic contributions (such as the Needham-Schroeder protocol and the economics of computer security), as well as vibrant current research (the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre, CHERI processor architecture, and hardware tamper lab). Security is one of the ten core research themes in the department. We take a holistic and interdisciplinary view of the topic, so while we look in detail at many of the technical areas, we also work across traditional subject boundaries to tackle major challenges.


We are looking for someone who can demonstrate they are capable of world-class research which will complement existing expertise in the Department. Given the fast-moving nature of the field, evidence of breadth and flexibility in research is expected.


We aim to substantially broaden coverage of security-related research and teaching in the Department and we welcome applications relating to a wide range of security and privacy topics, including cryptography, cryptographic protocols and verification, distributed-systems security, malware analysis, forensics, machine learning, privacy, software security, computer hardware security, human factors, ledger technologies, and security economics.


The full details are available here.

Hiring for iCrime

A Research Assistant/Associate position is available at the Department of Computer Science and Technology to work on the ERC-funded Interdisciplinary Cybercrime Project (iCrime). We are looking to appoint a computer scientist to join an interdisciplinary team reporting to Dr Alice Hutchings.

iCrime incorporates expertise from criminology and computer science to research cybercrime offenders, their crime type, the place (such as online black markets), and the response. Within iCrime, we sustain robust data collection infrastructure to gather unique, high quality datasets, and design novel methodologies to identify and measure criminal infrastructure at scale. This is particularly important as cybercrime changes dynamically. Overall, our approach is evaluative, critical, and data driven.

Successful applicants will work in a team to collect and analyse data, develop tools, and write research outputs. Desirable technical skills include:

– Familiarity with automated data collection (web crawling and scraping) and techniques to sustain the complex data collection in adversarial environments at scale.
– Excellent software engineering skills, being familiar with Python, Bash scripting, and web development, particularly NodeJS and ReactJS.
– Experience in DevOps to integrate and migrate new tools within the existing ecosystem, and to automate data collection/transmission/backup pipelines.
– Working knowledge of Linux/Unix.
– Familiarity with large-scale databases, including relational databases and ElasticSearch.
– Practical knowledge of security and privacy to keep existing systems secure and protect against data leakage.
– Expertise in cybercrime research and data science/analysis is desirable, but not essential.

Please read the formal advertisement (at https://www.jobs.cam.ac.uk/job/34324/) for the details about exactly who and what we’re looking for and how to apply — and please pay special attention to our request for a covering letter!

Hiring for iCrime

We are hiring two Research Assistants/Associates to work on the ERC-funded Interdisciplinary Cybercrime Project (iCrime). We are looking to appoint one computer scientist and one social scientist to work in an interdisciplinary team reporting to Dr Alice Hutchings.

iCrime incorporates expertise from criminology and computer science to research cybercrime offenders, their crime type, the place (such as online black markets), and the response. We will map out the pathways of cybercrime offenders and the steps and skills required to successfully undertake complex forms of cybercrime. We will analyse the social dynamics and economies surrounding cybercrime markets and forums. We will use our findings to inform crime prevention initiatives and use experimental designs to evaluate their effects.

Within iCrime, we will develop tools to identify and measure criminal infrastructure at scale. We will use and develop unique datasets and design novel methodologies. This is particularly important as cybercrime changes dynamically. Overall, our approach will be evaluative, critical, and data driven.

If you’re a computer scientist, please follow the link at: https://www.jobs.cam.ac.uk/job/30100/

If you’re a social scientist, please follow the link at: https://www.jobs.cam.ac.uk/job/30099/

Please read the formal advertisements for the details about exactly who and what we’re looking for and how to apply — and please pay special attention to our request for a covering letter!

10/06/21 Edited to add new links

Third Annual Cybercrime Conference

The Cambridge Cybercrime Centre is organising another one day conference on cybercrime on Thursday, 12th July 2018.

We have a stellar group of invited speakers who are at the forefront of their fields:

They will present various aspects of cybercrime from the point of view of criminology, policy, security economics, law and industry.

This one day event, to be held in the Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge will follow immediately after (and will be in the same venue as) the “11th International Conference on Evidence Based Policing” organised by the Institute of Criminology which runs on the 10th and 11th July 2018.

Full details (and information about booking) is here.

Leaving on a jet plane: the trade in fraudulently obtained airline tickets

Over the years, I’ve had friends and acquaintances ask me about unauthorised transactions for flight bookings made with their credit cards. The question is usually along the lines of, if the airlines know what flight is being travelled, why don’t the police go and meet the passenger?

This is a great question, but it’s often not quite so straightforward. Although Europol co-ordinates regular Global Airline Action Days, during which those travelling may be detained, this does not create disincentives for those actually obtaining the airline tickets.

A few years ago, Professor Nicolas Christin at Carnegie Mellon University mentioned to me that he was aware of cheap airline tickets being advertised on an online black market. This comment led to an in-depth research project, covering all corners of the globe, to understand how these tickets were being obtained, and why.

You can read more about my research here, including how some of these tickets are connected to other crime types, such as human smuggling and trafficking; theft (including pickpocketing and shoplifting from airport stores); smuggling cash and contraband, such as drugs, cigarettes and tobacco; facilitating money laundering (such as opening bank accounts in other countries); and credit card fraud, including making transactions with compromised cards, and operating skimmers.

AlphaBay and Hansa Market takedowns

Yesterday the FBI announced the takedown of the AlphaBay marketplace, a hidden service facilitating the sale of drugs, as well as other illicit products and services. The takedown had actually occurred weeks earlier, and had been staged to appear like an exit scam, where the operators take off with the money.

What was particularly interesting about the FBI’s takedown was that it was coordinated with the activities of the Dutch police, who had previously taken over the Hansa Market, another leading blackmarket. As the investigators were then controlling this marketplace they were able to monitor the activities of traders who had been using AlphaBay and then moved to Hansa Market.

I’ve been interested in online blackmarkets for some time, particularly those that relate to the stolen data economy. In fact, last year a paper written by Professor Thomas Holt and I was published. This paper outlines a number of intervention approaches, including disrupting the actual marketplaces where trade takes place.

Among our numerous suggestions are three that have been used, in combination, by this international police effort. We suggest that law enforcement promote distrust, which they did by making AlphaBay appear to have been an exit scam. We also suggest that law enforcement take over and take down marketplaces. Neither of these police approaches are new, and we point to previous examples where this has happened. In our conclusion, we stated:

Multiple interventions coordinated across different guardians, nationally and internationally, incorporating different bodies (investigative, regulatory, strategic, non-government organisations and the private sector) that have ownership of the crime prevention problem may reduce duplication of effort, as well as provide a more systematic approach with the greatest disruption effect.

The Hansa Market and AlphaBay approach demonstrates how this can be achieved. By co-ordinating the approaches, and working together, the disruptive effects of their work is likely to be much greater than if they had acted alone. It’s likely we’ll see arrests of traders and further disruption to the online drug trade.

Work by Soska and Christin found that after the Silk Road takedown, more online blackmarkets emerged and evolved. I think this evolution will continue, but perhaps marketplace administrators will have to work harder in order to earn the trust of their users.

Exploring the provision of online booter services

A manuscript authored by myself and Richard Clayton has recently been published as an advance access paper in the criminology journal Deviant Behavior.

This research uses criminological theories to study those who operate ‘booter services’: websites that illegally offer denial of service attacks for a fee. We interviewed those operating the sites, and found that booter services provide ‘easy money’ for the young males that run them. The operators claim they provide legitimate services for network testing, despite acknowledging that their services are used to attack other targets. Booter services are advertised through the online communities where the skills are learned and definitions favorable toward offending are shared. Some financial services proactively frustrate the provision of booter services, by closing the accounts used for receiving payments.

For those accessing the paper from universities, you may find the paper here. The ‘accepted manuscript’, which is the final version of the paper before it has been typeset, can be accessed here.

Arresting development?

There have been no arrests or charges for cybercrime events in the UK for almost two months. I do not believe that this apparent lack of law enforcement action is the result of any recent reduction in cybercrime. Instead, I predict that a multitude of coordinated arrests is being planned, to take place nationally over a short period of time.

My observations arise from the Cambridge Computer Crime Database (CCCD), which I have been maintaining for some time now. The database contains over 400 entries dating back to January 2010, detailing arrests, charges, and prosecutions for computer crime in the UK.

Since the beginning of 2016, there have been no arrests or charges for incidents that fit within the scope of the CCCD that I have picked up using various public source data collection methods. The last arrest was in mid-December, when a male was arrested on suspicion of offences under sections 1 and 2 of the Computer Misuse Act. Press coverage of this arrest linked it to the VTech data breach.

A coordinated ‘cyber crime strike week’ took place in early March 2015. In just one week, 57 suspects were arrested for a range of offences, including denial of service attacks, cyber-enabled fraud, network intrusion and data theft, and malware development.

Coordinated law enforcement action to address particular crime problems is not uncommon. A large number of arrests is ‘newsworthy’, capturing national headlines and sending the message that law enforcement take these matters seriously and wrongdoers will be caught. What is less clear is whether one week of news coverage would have a greater effect than 52 weeks of more sustained levels of arrest.

Furthermore, many of the outcomes of the 2015 arrests are unknown (possibly indicating no further action has been taken), or pending. This indicates that large numbers of simultaneous arrests may place pressure on the rest of the criminal justice system, particularly for offences with complex evidentiary requirements.